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I. INTRODUCTION
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c) states in pertinent part, "The appellant or cross-appellant may
file a brief in reply to the brief of the respondent or cross-respondent within the time limit
specified by Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) which may contain additional argument in rebuttal to the
contentions of the respondent."
This Reply Brief contains "additional argument in rebuttal to the contentions" of the
Respondents.
This Reply Brief is necessarily limited to the current Record on Appeal as of the filing
deadline for this brief of February 16, 2010. Prior to the filing deadline, Appellant's filed a
motion to augment the record with additional exhibits and transcripts. A decision on the motion
to augment will not occur until aRer the deadline for filing the brief of February 16, 2010. Any
briefing dealing with any documents or transcripts augmented to the record pursuant to
Appellant's motion will be presented in supplemental briefing if allowed by this Court.
The facts presented and course of proceedings in this matter set forth in Appellant's Brief
were not disputed by Respondent. Respondent's Brief, p. 1.

11. ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court's review of the District Court's Decision on Defendant Robertson's
Motion for Summary Judgment is appropriate because it effectively granted to Respondent
partial s w a r y judgment finding that LC.
that I.C.

5

3 49-2417 applies to implements of husbandry and

49-916 and LC. Ej 49-903 require owners of implements of husbandry to have

operational lighting systems at all times. This Court should reverse the District Court's decision
with regard to those issues.

The District Court abused its discretion in failing to uphold the jury's answers to the
specific interrogatories on the Special Verdict Form by granting a new trial. This Court should
reverse the District Court's decision granting a new trial.
A)

The District Court Erred in Deciding That Imputed Liability Applied to
Implements of Husbandry.
1.

Standard of Review

The proper standard of review in this matter is that which applies to District Court
decisions granting motions for summary judgment. This standard was set forth in Appellant's
Brief. Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9.
This Court has held, "Summary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the
moving party, and on any or all of the causes of action involved, under the rules of civil
procedure." Bvummett v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724, 726, 682 P.2d 1271, 1273 (1984). This ruling
was reiterated in Hawood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001). In Hawood, this
Court expanded upon the ruling set forth in Brummet, by stating: "The district court may grant
sunlmary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the
court. A motion for s m a r y judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as
a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it, as in this case."
Id. at 677, 39 P.3d at 617.
The District Court in this matter granted to the non-moving party, Respondent, partial
summary judgment on the allegation of imputed liability under I.C. § 49-2417. Appellant
brought the motion for summary judgment arguing that LC.

5

49-2417 did not apply to the

implement of husbandry owned by Appellant. R. 482, Defendant Roberton's Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-8-06 at 12. This issue involved the

undisputed fact that the Appellant's vehicles involved in the accident were a tractor pulling an
implement of husbandry. Due to the relevant facts being undisputed and admitted, the District
Court simply ruled upon the issue in favor of Respondent.
The District Court's ruling did not simply deny Appellant's motion for summary
judgment based upon their being a genuine issue of fact, but ruled positively, "that an implement
of husbandry (i.e., a tractor pulling a hay baler) constitutes a motor vehicle for purposes of Idaho
Code

5

49-2417. R. p. 444. Regarding this ruling, the District Court did not state that any

further fact-finding was necessary. The effect of the District Court's decision is that Respondent
was granted partial summary judgment on the issue of imputed liability.
The Respondents cited authority in the Respondents' Brief regarding appealing denials of
motions for summary judgment. Respondents' Brief, pp. 3-5. Appellant does not dispute that
these cases are applicable to circumstances where a district court has only denied a motion for
summary judgment finding that the matter must proceed to trial in order to have a fact-finder
determine the outcome of the issue. These cases are not applicable to instances where a district
court has ruled in favor of a non-moving party essentially granting partial summary judgment in
their favor.
Unlike the case of Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007) relied upon by
Respondents, Appellant is requesting that this Court rule on those issues in the District Court's
decision where it effectively grants summary judgment in favor of Respondent and not asking
this Court to carve out an exception to the rule that denials of motions for summary judgment
cannot be reviewed on appeal. As established above, the District Court in this matter granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Respondents in regard to the issue of imputed liability.
Therefore, the issue of the applicability of LC.

3

49-2417 to implements of husbandry is

appealable to this Court under the standard of review governing the review of a district court's
granting of summary judgment. This standard of review was set forth in Appellant's Brief and
was not disputed by Respondents. Appellant's Brief, pp. 8-9.
2.

LC. 6 49-2417 (1) Does Not Impute Liability upon the Owner of an Implement of

13usbandrv
The following recitation of authority was originally cited in the Appellant's Brief, but is
reproduced for ease of reference. The construction of a legislative act presents a pure question of
law for this Court to decide. Crauford v. Dept. of Correcfions, I33 Idaho 633,635,991 P.2d 358,
360 (1999). Courts also exercise free review over the interpretation of statutes. Adamson v.

Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602,605,990 P.2d 1213,1216, (1999).
"Courts are empowered to resolve ambiguities in statutes by ascertaining and giving effect
to legislative intent." Easley v. Lee, 111 Idaho 115, 118, 721 P.2d 215, 218 (1986) citing: Nampa

Lodge No. 1389 a? Smylie, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1951). "The act should be construed in its
entirety and as a whole for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent, and where different
sections reflect light upon each other they are regarded as inpari materia." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held, "'all parts of a statute should be given meaning,'
and the Court 'will construe a statute so that effect is given to its provisions, and no part is rendered
superfluous or insignificant."' Morelandv. Adam, 143 Idaho 687,690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007)
citing: Idaho Cardiolop Associates, P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223, 226,
108 P.3d 370,373 (2005).
The relevant statutes in this matter are all found in the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act (the
"Act").
Idaho Code

3 49-2417(1) provides:

4

Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury
to a person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or
operating the vehicle with the permission, express implied, of the owner, and the
negligence of the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil
damages. (Emphasis added).
Idaho Code 3 49-2417(1) by its plain language applies only to "motor vehicles" as
defined in this statute and not to the tractor and baler that are at issue in this lawsuit. A motor
vehicle is defined under I.C. 5 49-123 (g) as:
Every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by
electric power obtained by overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails,
except vehicles moved solely by human power, electric personal assistive
mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs. 49-123(g)
Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 49-1 10(2), the applicable definitions section of the Act, a farm
tractor when drawing an implement of husbandry such as a baler is to be defined as an
implement of husbandry for purposes of the Act:
"Implements of husbandry" means every vehicle including self-propelled u n h , designed
or adapted and used exclusively in agricultural, horticultural, dairy and livestock growing
and feeding operations when being incidentally operated. Such implements include, but
are not limited to, combines, discs, dry and liquid fertilizer spreaders, cargo tanks,
harrows, hay balers, harvesting and stacking equipment, pesticide applicators, plows,
swathers, mint tubs and mint wagons, and farm wagons. A farm tractor when attached to
or drawing any implement of husbandry shall be construed to be an implement of
husbandry. "Implements of husbandry" do not include semitrailers, nor do they include
motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits their use to agricultural, horticultural,
dairy or livestock growing and feeding operations. (Emphasis added).
This provision specifically states that implements of husbandry do not include motor
vehicles.

Because the tractor and baler are defined as an implement of husbandry and not as a

motor vehicle for purposes of the Act, the legislature has through its definitions exempted
implements of husbandry from the imputed liability provision of Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1).
Where, as here, Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1) specifically applies only to motor vehicles,
implements of husbandry are excluded from imputed liability pursuant to this provision of the

Act. Under the rule of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as well as the
plain language of the statutes themselves, Idaho Code § 49-2417 (1) is inapplicable to the case at
bar. See Poison Creek Publishing, Inc., v. Central Idaho Publishing, Inc., 134 Idaho 426,3 P.3d
1254 (Ct. App. 2000).
The District Court in ruling that LC. 3 49-2417 includes the tractor and hay baler at issue
presumes that a hay baler becomes a motor vehicle simply because it is attached to a tractor. The
District Court essentially admitted that many, if not most implements of husbandry would be
excluded from I.C.

3 49-2417.

The District Court stated that, "To be sure, hay balers do not

constitute motor vehicles." R., p. 451. Here the District Court essentially admits that despite
the Idaho Legislature not specifically excluding implements of husbandry from I.C. 3 49-2417, it
does exclude hay balers and any other implements of husbandry not self-propelled.
The District Court and Respondents fail to address the fact that it was the hay baler that
the deceased's vehicle impacted, not the tractor. The assumption made by the District Court and
Respondents is that once a hay baler is connected to a tractor, the hay baler becomes a motor
vehicle under LC. 3 49-123 (g). Rather, the Idaho Legislature took the steps necessary to specify
that when a tractor is attached to a hay baler it becomes an implement of husbandry, not that the
hay baler becomes a motor vehicle. LC. § 49-1 lO(2). By defining implements of husbandry in
I.C. 3 49-1 10(2), the Idaho Legislature shows its intent is to not treat implements of husbandry as
motor vehicles. Idaho Code § 49-2417 does not apply to implements of husbandry, because the
Idaho Legislature does not treat implements of husbandry as motor vehicles. The Legislature's
intent then is that a hay baler should not be treated differently under the Act simply because it is
attached to a tractor. Interpreting I.C. Ej 49-2417 to apply to this hay baler would be going
against the plain intent of the Legislature.

Based upon the plain intent of the Idaho Legislature, Appellant's request that this Court
reverse the District Court's decision and rule that LC.

5 49-2417 does not apply to hay balers

even when they are attached to tractors.

B.

The District Court Erred in Deciding that I.C. §§ 49-902, 903 and 916 Requires
Implements of Husbandry to Have an Operational Lighting System at All Times.

1.

Standard of Review

As with the District Court's decision regarding imputed liability under I.C. 5 49-2417, the
District Court's effectively granted partial summary judgment to Respondent on the issue
whether LC.

$5

49-902, 903 and 916 require implements of husbandry to have an operational

lighting system at all times. Pursuant to the argument above, the standard of review on appeal
for this issue is the standard applied to a district court's decision granting summary judgment.
2.

Idaho Code 66 49-902. 903 and 916 do not Reauire Imulements of Husbandrv to

Have Ouerational Lighting Systems at all Times
This inquiry also involves the interpretation of Idaho statutes and the previously provided
case citations regarding statutory interpretation apply in this instance and throughout our brief.
Respondents' First Amended Complaint alleges negligence per se against Appellant.
Respondents' allegation of negligence per se in this case is predicated on the improper
interpretation of LC.

5 49-916.

In support of their claim for negligenceper se against Appellant,

Respondents alleged that "[bly allowing Mr. Dustin Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on a
public road after sunset without visible tail lights or reflectors, Appellate Robertson was in direct
violation of the provisions of Idaho Code § 49-916."
Complaint, ll 37.

R, p. 42, Plaintiffs First Amended

The relevant provisions relating to this question are Idaho Code $5 49-902(1) and (3); 49903; 49-916(3) and (4). These code sections were set forth in the Appellant's Brief in full, but
are reproduced in this brief for convenience. Idaho Code

5 49-902(1) and (3) state (Emphasis

added):
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, or for the owner to cause or
knowingly permit to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle or combination of
vehicles which is in an unsafe condition as to endanger any person, or which does not
contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with the lamps and other requirements
in proper condition and adjustment, as required by the provisions of this chapter, or
which is equipped in any manner in violation of the provisions of this chapter.

(3) The provisions of this chapter, with respect to equipment on vehicles, shall not apply
to implements of husbandry, road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or slow moving
vehicles except as otherwise specifically made applicable.
Idaho Code 5 49-903 states:
Every vehicle upon a highway at any time from sunset to sunrise and at any other
time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and
vehicles on the highway at a distance of five hundred (500) feet ahead shall display
lighted lamps and illuminating devices as here respectively required for different
classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respect to parked vehicles as stated
herein.
Idaho Code 4 49-916(3) and (4) state:
(3) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled unit of farm equipment or
implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting system shall at all times
specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with two (2) single-beam or
multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of sections 49-922 or 49-924,
Idaho Code, respectively or, as an alternative, section 49-926, Idaho Code, and two
(2) red lamps visible from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet to the
rear, or in the alternative, one (1) red lamp visible from a distance of not less than
five hundred (500) feet to the rear and two (2) red reflectors visible from a distance
of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to the rear when illuminated by the
upper beams of head lamps. Red lamps or reflectors shall be mounted in the rear
of the farm tractor or self-propelled implement of husbandry to indicate as nearly
as practicable the extreme left and right projections of the vehicle on the highway.

(4) The farm tractor element of every combination of farm tractor and towed farm
equipment or towed implement of husbandry equipped with an electric lighting
system shall at all times specified in section 49-903, Idaho Code, be equipped with
two (2) single-beam or multiple-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of
sections 49-922,49-924, or 49-926, Idaho Code.
These provisions of the Idaho Code prohibit the operation of an implement of husbandry
on a public roadway between "sunset" and "sunrise" and "at any other time when there is not
sufficient light" without the equipment required by LC.

9 49-916.

This standard applies to any

person operating the relevant machinery.
The statutory duty of an owner of an implement of husbandry is further limited by I.C. 9
49-902(1) at times when they are not the operator of the vehicle, by requiring that there be a
showing the owner "cause[d] or knowingly permit[ted] to be driven" a vehicle that is in violation
of the specific requirements of the chapter. LC. $49-902(1)
The question of whether a statute imposes a duty upon a particular person or entity is a
question of law which the Court freely reviews. Mugavero v. A-I Auto Sales, Inc., 130 Idaho
554, 557, 954 P.2d 141, 154 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, in reviewing Respondent's negligence
per se claim, this Court may make its own determination for purposes of appeal whether the

statute cited by Respondents establishes a duty on behalf of Appellant as a matter of law.
The Idaho Legislature has also created a separate standard for implements of husbandry
than for other vehicles. The District Court erred by essentidly finding that Appellant had a duty
to ensure that his implements of husbandry had operational lighting systems at all times. The
District Court began by setting forth the appropriate statutes, but misapplied the holding of State
v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 6 P.3d 416 (Ct.App. 2000) in d i n g that, "if the lighting equipment is
not operational as required by Idaho Code

9 49-916 with regard to farm equipment, one simply

does not move it on a highway. To do so, violates the plain provisions of statutory law, which

Defendant Robertson allowed with Dustin Kukla. R, p. 441. As discussed above, the abovequoted portion shows that the District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Respondent by ruling that Appellant, Defendant Robertson, violated LC. rj 49-916.
The District Court erred in it analysis because the Evans case is not directly applicable in
this matter because it did not involve an implement of husbandry which is treated differently
than a normal vehicle under I.C. rj 49-902. As set forth in more detail in the Appellant's Brief,
the Evans case deals with an individual driving a car not an implement of husbandry.
Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17. The Court of Appeals in Evans did not address the difference in
the statutory language and differing requirements between I.C. rj 49-905 and I.C. rj 49-916.
The District Court also failed to analyze the plain language of I.C. rj 49-902(3) and LC. rj
49-916 in applying the holding of Evans to implements of husbandry, including Appellant's hay
baler. The District Court and Respondents overlook the fact that Idaho Code rj 49-902(1) must
be read in conjunction with the plaint language of LC. rj 49-902(3) which states that, "The
provisions of this chapter (including I.C. rj 49-902(1)), with respect to equipment on vehicles,
shall not apply to implements of husbandry

...

except as otherwise specifically made

applicable." I.C. rj 49-902(3) (Emphasis added). The Idaho Legislature essentially stated that
LC. rj 49-902(1) has no applicability to implements of husbandry unless some provision
specifically makes it applicable. The Legislature's intent is to treat implements of husbandry
different from other motor vehicles.
The equipment rules for implements of husbandry are specifically set forth in LC. rj 49916. Unlike LC. rj 49-905 that was interpreted in Evans, LC. rj 49-916 contains the following
language preceding the equipment requirements in each of its major subparagraphs, "shall at all
times specified in section 49-903".

Idaho Code rj 49-916 limits the equipment requirements to

the times set forth in I.C. 5 49-903, not the times set forth in I.C. 5 49-902(1). The inclusion of
the specific reference to LC. § 49-903 in I.C. 5 49-916 is especially revealing considering the
omission of any reference to LC. 3 49-903 in LC. § § 49-905, 906,907,909 and 915.
The District Court and Respondents analyze LC.

5 49-902(1); I.C. 5 49-903 and I.C. 5

49-916 as if the language in them and how they relate to one another were ambiguous. They
both attempt to interpret the Idaho Legislature's intent by using the rule of statutory construction
in para materia. The application of this and other rules of statutory construction is only

appropriate if the legislative intent cannot be discerned by the plain meaning of the language of
the statutes. Unlike LC. § 49-905 interpreted in Evans, LC. 5 49-916 by plain language limits its
requirements to the times set forth in I.C.

5 49-903.

To interpret the requirements of I.C.

5 49-

916 to be required at all times would be to impermissibly render meaningless the limiting phrase
in I.C. 3 49-916, "shall at all times specified in section 49-903".
The District Court's decision that lighting requirements of LC.

5 49-916 are required at

all times and that Appellant violated this statute should be reversed.
C)

The Jury's Verdict that Appellate Robertson's Actions were not a Proximate Cause
of the Respondents' Injuries Should be Upheld?

1.

Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has stated that: "This Court reviews the grant of a motion for a new
trial based upon I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) under an abuse of discretion standard." Warren v. Sharp, 139
Idaho 599, 603, 83 P.3d 773, 777 (2003); quoting: Sheridan v. St. Lukes Reg? Med. Ctr., 135
Idaho 775,781,25 P.3d 88,94 (2001).
"To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers
whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries

of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho
46, 5 1, 995 P.2d 816, 82 1 (2000); citing: Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,
981 P.2d 1146, 1 150 (1999).
When faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look at the
evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way."

Cook V. State, Dept. of Tramp. 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), Griflth v. Latham
Motors, Inc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572,576 (1996).
2.

The District Court Failed to Act Within Its Discretion

The District Court's order is devoid of any discussion of its discretion or the legal standards
it is to apply in reviewing a potentially inconsistent special verdict. R., pp. 453-455. At the hearing
on the motion for new trial the District C o k stated:
It is a motion for a new trial, which is a little bit different than when you renew a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because what it does is it calls upon me to
weigh the evidence, and determine, one, whether the verdict was against - my' view - by the
clear weight of the evidence.
And then, secondly whether a new trial would produce a different result.
So, essentially, that's my mission, because I have a broader discretion than, say, a
motion for a directed verdict or nlv - that's a law thing. But, this is a "weight" thing.
So, with this weighty issue, Mr. Nicholson, it's your motion, I will allow you to go
first.
Tr. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial - September 15,2008, p. 19, L. 11-23. Here the District Court
states that he has broad discretion and states two determinations he has to make in regard to the
motion for new trial. Namely, whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and
whether a new trial would produce a different result. These standards are the standards for

analyzing a motion for new trial under IRCP 59(a)(6). In order to grant a new trial pursuant to
IRCP 59(a)(6) on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against the law, the trial court must determine both (I) the jury verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence, and (2) a new trial would produce a different result. City of McCall v.

Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118, (Idaho 2006); Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d
188 (1990.
Despite the District Court's statements at the hearing, the District Court's Order on Motion
for New Trial does not adequately address these two questions. The District Court does not
comment on whether a new trial would produce a different result and does not state that the verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. It is apparent that there is a discrepancy between the
District Court's statement regarding its discretion at the hearing and its treatment of the matter in its
order. As pointed out by Respondent, the District Court is granting the motion for new trial
pursuant to IRCP 49@).
Further, the District Court did not cite to any applicable legal standards that would apply to
its discretion. Most importantly, the District Court did not acknowledge the standard set forth above

which is that when faced with arguably inconsistent special jury verdicts, the trial court "must look
at the evidence and the instructions given and see if there is a view of the case that makes the jury's
answer consistent. If there is this consistent view, the court must resolve the case in that way."

Cook v. State, Dept. of Tmnsp. 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150, (Idaho 1999), Grz$th v. Latham
Motors, Znc., 128 Idaho 356,360,913 P.2d 572,576 (1996). In regard to this standard, the District
Court apparently did not consider the direction in IRCP 49@) for dealing with inconsistencies in a
special verdict form that, "When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is

inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with
the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict ...." IRCP 49(b).
The District Court failed to acknowledge certain standards when considering the motion for
new trial and did not adequately address the standards that it did reference at the hearing in the
order. The District Court abused its discretion in granting the motion for new trial.
The jury consistently found that the actions of Appellant were not a proximate cause of
Respondent's damages. The special verdict form instructed the jury that if they answered yes to the
questions regarding proximate cause as to any of the claims for any of the parties, then they were to
proceed to Question 10 pertaining to fault. Question 10 then instructed the jury to apportion fault.
The jury is then advised that the sum must equaI 100%.
In the present case, it is clear that the jury did not intend to find that the actions of Appellant
Robertson were the proximate cause of Respondent's damages. Each time the question was asked
with respect to proximate cause as to AppeIIant Robertson, the jury answered "No." Neither the
District Court nor Respondent state or argue that the jury's responses that Appellant was not a
proximate cause of the damages went against the weight of the evidence presented at trial.
Similarly, neither the District Court nor Respondent argue that another jury would find differently

than the present jury found with regard to the special interrogatories regarding negligence and
proximate cause.
The sole dispute is the contention that a special verdict form that has responses to specific
questions which are inconsistent with the general verdict are against the law. As stated in IRCP
49(b), special verdict forms that have inconsistencies between the answers to the interrogatories and
the general verdict are not u n l a d , but can be remedied by having the district court enter judgment
in accordance with the specific answers.

A jury verdict which does not violate Idaho law should be cast aside so lightly. Such a
result would undermine the principle of the finality of trials. If at all possible, the jury's verdict
should be upheld. The District Court's failure to recognize the legal standards for deciding these
issues establishes that it abused its discretion.
Appellant therefore requests that this Court find that the jury's verdict was not inconsistent
and reverse the District Court's decision granting Respondent's motion for new trial.

1II.CONCLUSION
Based upon the facts presented and the record on appeal, this Court should reverse the
District Court's rulings on (1) Appellant's motion for summary judgment and (2) Respondents'
motion for new trial.
The District Court misinterpreted case law and statutes in finding that owners of
implements of husbandry are subject to imputed liability under I.C.
Court also failed to properly analyze LC.

5

49-2417. The District

$5 49-902(1) and (3); 49-903 and 49-916, in finding

that implements of husbandry are required to have the lighting requirements of I.C.

9 49-916 at

all times.
The District Court abused its discretion in granting the motion for new trial and should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 16' day of February 2010.
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